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^SUMMARY
This report presents an approach for developing acquisition
strategies which can be tailored to the needs of specific
R&D systems.
An acquisition strategy is a management plan which is designed
to achieve particular acquisition goals by employing appropriate
business and program practices in a coordinated manner. In
NASA, the acquisition process typically includes a variety of
activities (project plans, RFP's, SEB's, negotiation, contract
administration), over an extended period of time, and involving
a variety of headquarters and field center decision-making and
reviewing authorities. In addition, the process is inter-
organizational in that both NASA and the contractor have an
active role in the process. Consequently, an acquisition strategy
must consider the goals and activities of the contractor if an
effective working relationship is to be achieved and if goals
are to be met. However, since contractors vary in terms of their
goals and management styles, and projects vary in terms of their
requirements and uncertainties, no single acquisition strategy
can be identified for all situations.
The approach to developing a strategy which is advocated in
this report incorporates five basic elements:
1. Definition of project goals and priorities;
2. Analysis of.the contractor's motives, environment,
and constraints;
3. Analysis of the NASA-contractor inter-organizational
relationship;
4. Selection of a set of strategies and practices for
planning and control;
5. Modification of strategies or practices as necessary
due to changes in contractor strategies or due to
unforeseen contingencies.
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In addition, in order to provide some basis for implementing
this approach the report provides some discussion of key factors
which should be considered in developing a specific strategy.
These factors include the following:
* What are some useful criteria for setting operational
project goals and priorities?
* What are the various contractor motives for doing
business with NASA?
* How are contractor motives and strategies influenced
by: the contractor's financial structure;
organizational structure and style; other business;
method of interacting with NASA personnel; NASA-
administered and regulatory contractual limitations?
* What information about the contractor is useful in
identifying ways to motivate him to achieve NASA goals?
* What are the factors governing the inter-organizational
relationship which determine the relative power of NASA
and the contractor or which lead to conflict between
them?
* Under what conditions can various strategies (e.g.
economic incentives such as award fees, formal cost/
schedule control systems, tight specifications) be
useful in achieving acquisition goals through improved
communications, control, or contractor motivations.
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INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this paper are to improve the understanding
of the process by which contractor strategies are developed
and to provide an improved- framework^for•"evaFuating appro^
priate management strategies for the acquisition of large-
scale systems through the application of inter-organizational
analysis. While this paper develops such strategies in the
context of the NASA-Contractor relationship, many of the
strategies appear applicable to other government agency acqui-
sitions.
Inter-organizational processes have been studied in a variety
of situations,(Benson, Stern, Warren, Litwak and Hoiton).
However, the studies seldom deal with the acquisition of
large scale systems involving R&D activity and significant
technological, performance, and/or cost uncertainities, over
a lengthy time frame. Such acquisitions are of paramount
importance to agencies such as NASA, HUD, DOD, DOT, to govern-
ment and private industry construction programssand to other
industries acquiring high technology equipment.
Sayles and Chandler provide some inputs on these processes in
a NASA-oriented 1971 publication. Drucker et. al. and Hunt
and Rubin have studied the inter-organizational relationship
in terms of interactions of technical personnel and project
management personnel.
Some discussion of informal influence processes, conflicts,
and relationships among contractors, project personnel,
Congress, and upper-level military and civilian management
is also available in. some of the more comprehensive studies.
(Scherer, Logistic Management Institute? Fox, Hunt).
In particular, the dynamic, life cycle aspect of this process
merits special attention. NASA's acquisition process for
major projects, consists of a set of interrelated stages involv-
ing several different! policy, decision-making, advisory and
management groups (Program Office, Field Center, Project
Manager,/Contracting Officer, Contract Administration, Procure-
ment, Legal, etc.)
On the other hand, contractors are often able to consolidate
decision-making and implementation effort to develop initial
strategies (including tactics for bids, negotiations, and
contract management) and to revise these as necessary.
Fragmented study of the acquisition process ignores the changi
ing environment and influence flows within and between the
buying organization and the contractors. Consequently, a
dynamic, integrative analysis of the acquisition process is
needed to fully understand contractor strategy and to develop
effective strategies and policies within NASA.
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Contractor Relationships
In developing a conceptual approach to the description and
analysis of the NASA-Contractor decision process, three
fundamental elements of this process were considered.
The first of these elements is the life cycle aspect of the
acquisition process for R&D systems. The contractor environ-
ment and the nature of the Contractor-NASA relationship change
as the process moves from stage to stage. The stages identified
for this purpose are:
1. Project Conceptualization and Definition -
Science and data acquisition requirements,
engineering requirements and technical
specifications, and estimated costs are all
defined.
2. Procurement Plan Development - Method of
competition, type of contract (fixed price
vs. cost-plus), fee provisions, (incentive
vs. award fees) and amount of government
furnished equipment are identified. Manage-
ment appro.YalvTs obtained'-.-"- ' • - . . : •
3. Source Evaluation and Award - Source eval-
uation board defines criteria for evaluation,
releases Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry,
develops specific evaluation criteria, evaluates
competitors' written and oral proposals,
recommends a source. Top field center or Head-
quarters management selects source.
4. Negotiation Between NASA and Contractor -
Negotiations'i:def ihe-*:speci'f ic •contractual- plans-
for obtaining incentive and award fees, define
target costs, contractor financial reporting
requirements, methods for progress payments and
for processing changes to technical plan.
5. Contract Implementation - Contractor completes
work on the system, manages subcontractor work,
NASA negotiates changes, monitors performance,
audits costs, and makes cost and fee payments.
The second major element is the basic management approach to
strategic decision-making. Generally speaking, a strategy is
a plan of activities designed to achieve one or more objectives,
based on an analysis of environmental opportunities and
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constraints. Consequently, our analysis incorporates (with-
in each stage) contractor objectives, environmental factors,
and strategic activities available to contractors. Normative
models of decision-making suggest that strategic activities
should be selected after analysis of environmental factors
and to attain one or more objectives.
The final element is the fact that the NASA-contractor relation-
ship is inter-organizational. That is, neither party makes
decisions in a vacuum. Rather, the parties are involved in
exchanges-jof resources, products, and information during the
process, and each party attempts to influence the technical
and business decisions of the other. .[The; appendices specify
inter-6rganiza;ti6na:l^  stage.
Inter-organizational Strategy
Because this relationship is inter-organizational, the process
of selecting an appropriate strategy must consider the antic-
ipated response of the other party.
The concept of "contingency management" appears to have, great
applicability for selecting strategies in such turbulent
acquisition environments (Murphy et. al.).
This concept suggests that organizations need to make decisions
which consider not merely the current environment (of contractors,
technology, costs, etc.) but also the impact of such decisions
in terms of their influence on the future state of the environ-
ment so that maximum flexibility for coping with future conditions
and new contractor strategies can be maintained.
In order to achieve a full understanding of this inter-organi-
zational process, this paper addresses the following issues:
1. What are NASA's goals and constraints?
2. What are contractor motives and how are they
shaped by the contractor environment?
3. What are the elements of the inter-organizational
relationship which influence each party's ability
to achieve desired results from the relationship?
4. What strategy options are available for influencing
relationships^- in -order1 ;to -increase either party' s
ability to control results?
Development of the frameworks presented in this paper incorporates
prior studies of contracting behavior in NASA and the Department
of Defense, books and monographs published by consultants to
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aerospace and defense contractors, general literature on
inter-organizational strategy, and interviews with NASA
project and Headquarters personnel pursuant to developing
case studies and other materials for an agency-wide Project -
Management Shared Experience Program.
NASA GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS
NASA objectives include the accomplishment of technical .mis-
sion performance, on schedule, within the scope of funding
contraints. Assurance of timely and reliable performance at
a reasonable cost is essential to meet the expectations of
external organizations ;(such as Congress, OMB, the Science
community, agencies and corporations which buy NASA services,
and the general public) .
The Apollo era in NASA was dominated by an agency perspective
which focused onciachieving specific mission achievements in a
defined time frame (especially in manned programs) and on
extending the state-of-the-art of technology.
While the current program dominating NASA (the Space Shuttle)
also requires a tremendous devotion to technical achievements,
the agency is -no longer free to place secondary emphasis on
costs. In order to maintain a balanced set of programs without
strangling Shuttle funding, all projects must be seriously
concerned with cost goals. Further, the successful implementation
of Shuttle will require development of a cost-effective system
which keeps user costs competitive with other existing or
potential launch vehicles - especially as NASA-funded launches
are reduced in proportion to reimbursables.
It is this changing thrust toward acquiring systems at low cost
which has dramatically increased the complexity of acquisition
management. Both NASA and contractor technical personnel prefer
to build advanced systems.with maximum capability and reliability
and typically have little interest in reducing costs.
Perrow points out that historically, organizations engaged in
non-routine technologies have focused on goals of quality,
innovation, and reliability. Such situations are con-
sistent with the technology development interests of project
team members and contractors.
Goals and Priorities
Agency goals as such probably have not changed as the result of
budgetary pressures. What has changed at the top level is the
set of agency constraints. In essence, the agency is still
committed to science, applications, and technology development.
Mission success is still paramount. However, agency-wide
-5-
productivity to achieve these goals has become an admin-
istrative objective at the top level in the agency.
Operational goals for specific projects are conditioned by
agency goals, administrative objectives at the Headquarters
levels, and the goals of centers, experimenters, users, and
project team members. Administrative objectives thus form
project constraints, within which other goals must be realized.
Additionally, a given project may be confronted by other
possible constraints which cannot be controlled to a great
degree such as critical launch schedules, visibility of the
project to external agencies and publics, and state-of-the-
art of technology.
Key elements in goal setting must include the following (of
which items 4, 5, and 6 are the most controversial):
1. Spacecraft performance goals;
2. Science data, collection and transmission goals;
3. Schedule goals;
4. Acceptable levels of risk and reliability;
5. Technology development goals;
6. Cost goals.
Inherent in item 4, is the issue of defining risk. While
statistical estimates of confidence levels for various
components can be developed through reliability testing and
through the use of redundant systems, the overall concept of
risk is a more subjective one and a dynamic one. Most project
managers appear to develop their own perceptions of risk which
change over the life cycle as problems and solutions occur.
Accordingly, it is probably impossible to obtain a single "risk"
goal. However, prioritizing the elements of a mission in terms
of their importance to project success, defining minimum
standards for success, and defining acceptable levels of cost
for testing, redundancy, etc.,- to achieve such standards is
possible.
In terms of goal development sequence and priority, technology
development should follow items 1-4. That is, on most
acquisitions, spacecraft and instrument performance have
primacy, and technology development should be restricted to
those areas in which development is required to achieve the
science objective. Establishing the balance between science
objectives and technology development objectives is thus a
primary issue.
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Defining target cost goals for a project traditionally
involves the application of statistical cost models which
relate the technical requirements of the proposed acquisition
to historical costs of similar R&D systems. The resulting
estimates (adjusted for inflation) will simply reflect the
expected cost of the system, assuming no excessive optimism
on problems with new technology and assuming no significant
changes in acquisition procedures (such as use of standard
components, changes in testing requirements, etc.). Achieving
performance within target cost will.mot be "low cost" performance
>if che target was based on a high cost analog. Appropriate
low cost goals are those established to achieve necessary
performance goals using acquisition procedures that minimize
cost within "acceptable" levels of risk, yet which avoid
"buy-in" optimism.
The critical element regarding goals is the issue of develop-
ing consensus. Effective commitment to a set of goals requires
that all parties believe in the general appropriateness and
feasibility of such goals.
Appropriateness requires that the specific goals be consistent
with the values and goals of individual members and units.
Feasibility suggests that goals are perceived as:
- achievable in technical terms;
- amenable to the management control systems
available;
- reasonably consistent over the life of the
project;
- amenable to unambiguous evaluation;
- open to review and modification at predetermined
intervals in response to possible contingencies-
identified in advance.
The primary impediment to developing goal consensus and to
achieving a consistent acquisition strategy may be the involve-
ment of multiple organizational units each of which has varying
concerns (as illustrated in the following table).
TABLE 1
l Component
Center Administration
Center Technical Functional
Offices
Project Office at Lead Center
Center Procurement Office
Source Evaluation Board
Contracting Officer
HQ Program Office
HQ Budget Office
Science Steering/Advisory
Groups and Users in Other
Agencies
HQ Top Management
HQ Low Cost Systems Office
Same £yiMary: Concerns
Use of manpower and develop-
ment of technical reputation
Advance technology
Meet schedule, and assure
performance of hardware
Maximize competition and
minimize protests
Contractor responsiveness
and capability
Appearance of reasonable
cost/performance outcome
Achieve mission goals,
satisfy user needs, and
obtain adequate funds
Assure adequacy of target
cost estimates
Maximize science/data return
per dollar
Positive cost and performance
visibility to outside
Maintain cost-effective
reliability standards
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CONTRACTOR OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVES
In their investigation of the NASA acquisition process, Hunt,
Rubin, and Perry attempted to determine contractors views on
what should be accomplished by the contract.
A summarization of contractor importance ratings yielded the
following rank order:
1. Foster quality performance;
2. Reduce contractor risk;
3. Safeguard proprietary interests;
4. Offer operational flexibility;
. 5. .Stimulate government-contractor communications
and work relationships;
6. Motivate cost control;
7. Yield a high profit;
8.' Reduce government technical direction or
surveillance;
9. Foster program discipline on methods and procedures.
While a few firms showed significant deviations, this pattern
tended to holdzacross large and small contractors.
Such results and the results of other studies have led to attempts
to inventory contractor motivations at a more general level (Hunt,
Scherer,
 ;Chisholm) .
Basic motivations which have been suggested include:
Organizational survival;
Organizational growth and development;
Maintaining present and future sales volume;
- Minimize:.wor.king capitol requirements;
Protection of corporate reputation with Government
Agencies;
Maintaining and developing personnel and technical
capabilities;
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- Advancing the level of the organization's technology;
.t.Tt jJO^ *
Coverage of Independent R&D;
Obtaining coiranercial spin-offs.
These have been summarized as motives which reflect the desire
for effective control or "mastery" of contractor operations and
environments. This mastery is comprised of two basic elements:
(Hunt)
Avoidance of risk and uncertainty;
- Maintaining the ability of the organization to
control its own fate and facilitate expression
of the technical interests of its personnel.
Actually, Hunt's "mastery" concept is hardly novel except perhaps
in the specific context of aerospace contractors. It is, in
essence, merely a restatement of the now classic observation by
Cyert and March (p. 119) that:
"Organizations avoid uncertainty.... They avoid the
requirement that they anticipate future negotiations
of other parts of their environment by arranging a
negotiated environment. They impose plans, standard
operating procedures, industry tradition, and
uncertainty absorbing contracts on the environment."
However, the results of the Hunt studies combined with earlier
works by Scherer have resulted inMncreased visibility for the
concept of extra-contractual motivations. Essentially, this
concept suggests that contractor managers and personnel are
motivated by factors other than profit. Further, the rate of
profit obtained on a given contract is viewed as subservient
to other motives as long as the economic viability of the firm
is maintained. Finally, the concept suggests that when.confronted
with the option of achieving profit from either higher technical
performance or lower cost, the former path will be selected.
While adequate evidence for extra-contractual incentives exists,
there is a danger in assuming that financial motiv.es will
 :
be of secondary importance to all contractors or to a given
contractor at all times and on all projects. In addition, other
environmental constraints will^exist which impinge upon achieve-
ment of contractor motivations and thus influence strategy.
CONTRACTOR ENVIRONMENT AND CONSTRAINTS
The contractor's motives must be viewed in the context of a
particular R&D acquisition if they are to be useful in selecting
a strategy. That is, a given contractor program manager must
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operate within a particular environment. The availability of
strategies for achieving one or more contract objectives will
be influenced not only by these underlying motives, but also
by the environmental, constraints surrounding the project. These
constraints include:
Contractor's Financial Environment;
Contractor Personnel, Organization, and Management;
"Other Business" Constraints;
Constraints on Interaction with NASA;
Project Specific Constraints.
Contractor's Financial Environment
Analysis of contractor's financial soundness is a formal part
of the contractor selection review process in the Source Eval-
uation Board. NASA Management Instructions with regard to this
process suggest that the latest balance sheet and profit and
loss statement will be utilized in evaluating financial position
of the company, and that consideration will be made for:
"rates and ratios";
working capital as measured by (current assets -
current liabilities);
- financial trends in net worth, sales, and profits;
methods of financing the contract, including an
assessment of the availability of outside funding
if necessary;
necessity of government financial aid.
However, in addition to analyzing the financial environment to
consider financial stability of a contractor, such analyses are
useful in understanding contractor motivations and strategy.
At any point in time, a contractor has some set of financial
goals and constraints which will exert some influence on strategy.
These may include the following:
A contractor needs to generate increased return-
on-investment (Net Profit t Net Equity) in order
to obtain capital funds in'outside money markets;
- A contractor needs to generate increased cash flow
in order to meet upcoming debt maturities;
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- A contractor operating below capacity needs increased
sales to more fully utilize personnel and equipment
and in order to cover fixed costs.
An understanding of such constraints is essential if all facets
of contractor strategy are to be considered. That is, con-
tractors may behave differently in terms of their reaction to
incentives depending upon the particular financial constraints
they face. Specific considerations which warrant attention in
this regard are presented below:
1. Return-on-investment - The current "Profit '76"
studies in the Defense Department are based on
the presumption that aerospace industry invest-
ment needs to be stimulated to improve efficiency.
Current government procedures for procurement
provide for establishing target fees on a percentage
of cost basis and then tying overhead rates to
direct labor hours, reducing industry incentives
to invest in labor saving equipment. To the extent
that a contractor has a need for improved return-
on- investment, then incentives which facilitate
such improvements may be effective. -
2. Financial Reporting - One of the limitations of
return-on-investment analysis in the aerospace
industry is the fact that contractors typically
represent only one division of large, often diver-
sified corporations. Such divisions typically do
not report information beyond total sales and net
profit to net sales ratios - if that, although "return
on capital -"employed may 'be estimated "at-the contract
or' at the divisional level's.- (See .Goodhue and
Lampert). Further, corporate financial strategy
may incorporate separate objectives for each division.
That is, a corporation may rely on one division for
cash flow, and another for a high profit to sales
ratio to support a third division which is capital
intensive.
3. Leverage - The size of a return on equity may not
present a full picture of a corporation'^.financial
position. As Martinelli has demonstrated, leverage
(the ratio of long term debt to net worth) among
contractors has risen sharply in the past decade.
Contractors with high return-on-investment ratios
may be in serious trouble if such ratios reflect
very high leveraging using debt which is about to
mature.
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To illustrate these points, 1974 preliminary data on several
major constractors is provided below: (Moody ' s , Standard & Poors)
Net Profit Net Profit Net Worth *Aerospace Sales
Company Net Worth Net Sales Long Term Debt Corp. Sales
Boeing 7.5% 1.9% 6.4 16.6%
General
Dynamics 11.7% 2.9% 4.1 5.8%
Grumman 26.4% 3.0% 0.8 93.0%
Thlo'ko-l-o L&..4'%s 5.8%. 15.7 ; 54.5%
Martin
Marietta 12.8% 6.6% 2.2 44.1%
McDonnell -
Douglas 13.9% 3.5% 7.4 14.0%
Rockwell 11.8% 2.9% 1.8 26.5%
TRW 14.0% 4.0% 1.4 10.0%
* Definition of "Aerospace" varied among companies to include
all aerospace (Grumman, Martin, and Rockwell-) -down to specific
"space" and "spacecraft/missiles" or "spacecraft and propulsion"
4. Divisional Goals - The smaller the contract, the
less likely it will even be amenable to return-on-
investment analysis, as facilities will increas-
ingly be shared with-other contracts. In short,
this concept - while important to the corporation
is unlikely to be established as a specific contract
goal. However, awareness of the financial leverage
constraints and other fixed costs, of cash flow
needs, or of net profit needs may improve awareness
of specific contract goals to the extent that a
given contract is expected to contribute to such
needs .
5. Net Profit Goals - Hunt, Rubin, and Perry (pp. 267-
268) found that large contractors tended to have
lower percentage profit goals - probably due to better
cash flow and to larger value of contracts (and thus
higher absolute profits) . For large contractors,
minimum acceptable profit ranged from 3% - 7%, while
the range for small contractors was 5% - 8%.
Where "reasonable" profits are expected to be achieved,
there is a tendency to have a declining marginal utility
of profit. That is, contractors who will clearly reach
profit goals are likely to be less motivated to pursue
cost savings investments, will avoid layoffs of key
personnel, and will focus on assuring reliability through
increased confidence testing .
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6. Contribution to Fixed Costs - Primary sources of
fixed costs facing the contractor are debt payments,
general and administrative expense, depreciation
and maintenance, and some indirect labor (assuming
that the bulk of engineering, supervisory, and
technical personnel will be retained even at excess
capacity). A contractor operating well below
capacity is likely to consider the financial attrac-
tiveness of a contract not merely in terms of account-
ing profit but in terms of the expected net contri-
bution to fixed overhead. If a contract covers all
variable costs and a portion of truly fixed overhead,
such a contractor will be better off than he would by
not having the contract even if an accounting loss is
incurred on the contract, since total divisional loss
is still reduced. Simiarly, overruns which reduce
profit may still yield improved divisional performance
if the incentive share lost per dollar of overrun is
less than the contribution to fixed overhead gained
from the government reimbursed share.
(For instance, a 20% - 80% share ratio saves a con-
tractor $.20 in profit on each cost dollar saved.
Failure to save the dollar gives net revenue of
$.80 [$1.00 in sales - $.20 contractor share]. If
over $.20 of the $.80 represents fixed cost to a con-
tractor below capacity, the net contribution to
divisional fixed overhead and profit will be greater
with the overrun dollar being spent.)
7. Cash Plow - Increasing the contribution to fixed
overhead, even at an (accounting) loss leads to
greater availability of cash for purposes of meeting
current obligations (payroll, debt, materials
purchases) to assure continuity of-business. Since
certain fixed costs (e.g. depreciation) are only
paper costs and others (e.g. G&A) can be delayed in
payment, increasing fixed costs charged to a project
will also lead to improved cash flow where a firm is
below capacity. While cash flow problems can frequently
be assessed by analysis of the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities, it should be recognized that
the "inventory" portion of current assets claimed by
aerospace contractors may be considerably less liquid
that for other types of businesses due to the limited
market for items such as airframes, spacecraft compo-
nents, etc. Further, corporate levels of current
assets and liabilities may not reflect the proportionate
breakdown for the aerospace division under review.
Depending on the profit center organization of the
corporation, such measures of working capital may or
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may not indicate the level of cash, flow pressures
on the aerospace division.
Ma:ha%:erite:n-t>
The contractor's organizational structure will impact the
acquisition effort to the extent it enhances or restricts
the contractor program manager authority.
Where the contractor is organized along strong functional
lines, a program manager has little authority over the
personnel and financial resources allocated to his project.
This may restrict his ability to:
alter work rates to change schedules;
develop cost-performance trade-offs;
influence overhead changed.., to his program;
stimulate technical personnel to respond to
incentives;
modify policies.
Under such conditions, the ability to respond to changes in
mission needs is more limited than in a more dedicated program
organization where all workers are responsible to the program
manager .
Additionally, contractors generally need to maintain a viable
labor mix and bidding capability simultaneously. Consequently,
top design engineers may be removed from projects once a contract
is signed. Thus the contractor may be constrained by the tech-
nical qualifications of his personnel.
Due to these constraints, it can be expected that evaluations
of the contractor program manager operating in a strong functional
organization will be more a function of technical performance and
total revenue than of profit percentage. However, financial
criteria will probably increase in importance for dedicated
organizations attached to very -lairge programs.
Also of concern is the constraint of disutilities (Scherer) .
These are organizational concerns regarding manpower utilization
policies. That is, contractors operating below capacity tend to
avoid layoffs which could reduce costs due to consideration of the
skills needed for future program and bidding needs (as well as due
to empire - building in functional divisions) .
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" Other Business" tConsta-aihtSi:^^ : •''_' - ••_[:;
Opportunity costs reflect the costs of lost profit and overhead
contribution opportunities incurred because a contractor approach-
ing full capacity foregoes an alternative contracts Consequently,
if larger, more profitable or more technically important proj-
ects are competing for contractor resources, the contractor pro-
gram manager may be constrained in responding to the needs of a
given project due to the absence of resources and the lack of
top management attention.
The existence of other business may pose constraints for other
reasons as well. If the "other business" is primarily commercial,
the government project may be a low priority set-aside for a
manpower pool. Further, the requirements of other, larger' con-
tracts may restrict the availability of high quality manpower for
managing sub-contractors - thus reducing the contractor's ability
to control a major amount of the contract outcome.
Constraints On Interac:ti:o.n. d' • A ': : -. . " .
Certain factors reflect those aspects peculiar to the relation-
ship between two organizations which constrain the ability to
maintain effective relationships between NASA and contractor
managers.
In reviewing a series of studies on NASA-contractor relationships,
Cirone suggested that government personnel tend to believe that
rigid structuring devices improve contract performance while
contractor personnel believe that inter-organizational processes,
communications, and interpersonal relationships are most effective,
However, recent project manager workshops appear to indicate that
NASA project managers are now more attuned to the need for inter-
organizational communication because formal contractor reporting
systems do not provide real-time visibility, may be misleading,
and fail to cover technical progress to an adequate degree and
because financial priorities of contractors may be unclear.
Key questions which should be investigated in order to understand
potential problems regarding such interaction include the follow-
ing:
1. Marketing Activities - Does the company have a
sufficient, well-experienced, well-known market-
ing staff to help you sell changes in your pro-
gram? Does its staff have the ability to keep
company management abreast of the present govern-
ment activities in the overall aspect of your
program?
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2. Contractor Involvement - Is your contract of
significant value or importance that the company
:feelis:£a&en-fc^ ^ Does the
company even know how important the contract is
in the mission of the project?
3. Patterns of Interaction, Coordination with NASA
Project Managers - Is the company used to work-
ing in the NASA environment? Will they help the
project along by providing required inputs on a
timely basis? Have they been known to help plan
or just take direction? Are they willing to seek
technical advice when needed?
4. Role Compatibility and Communications - Does the
contractor program manager have a single NASA
counterpart or rather overlapping contracts with
a number of personnel thus reducing the effective-
ness of inter-organizational communications.
In addition, interaction is impeded to the extent that: (Drucker,
et. al.)
NASA and contractor motives are divergent;
Contractor f's major problems are detailed design
and manufacturing, while NASA major problems are
technical evaluation, schedule, funding, and
change control;
Contractor delegates more authority (including a
chief engineer) while NASA project manager tends
to delegate less and often acts as chief engineer;
- Contractor program manager must also act as
middle man with subcontractors in many cases so
he has more outside interfaces.
Project Specific' ConstraUnts ~-__ . _ : ' " • . _ - • • '
Earlier, we suggested that contractors have both financial and
extra-contractual motivations. However, the contractor's ability
to achieve these goals and simultaneously satisfy NASA objectives
will be limited by project - specific constraints over which the
contractor has limited control.
These constraints include:
- reasonableness of NASA budget estimates;
- clarity and precision of performance objectives;
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- magnitude of required technological advances;
- contract type and structure of incentives;
limitations on cost accrual rates and funding
constraints;
use and limitations on use of parallel design
efforts or on reliability testing levels;
restrictions on technical changes.
Such constraints pose limitations to the contractor in terms of
restricting the options he may select in meeting financial goals
and in terms of restricting his "mastery" over his operations.
However, while contractors may modify goals in line with these
constraints, the non-NASA portion of the contractor environment
will not necessarily change. Consequently, contractor strategies
must evolve to deal with these goals and environmental constraints,
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INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
An inter-organizational analysis of the NASA-Contractor rela-
tionship views the network as a social system in which econo-
mic, political, sociological, and psychological forces are
operating (Benson). Inter-organizational analysis concepts
have been developed to describe and explain network-relation-
ships in a manner which incorporates relevant aspects of all
these disciplines. In fact, inter-organizational analysis has
been applied not only to business-related networks, but also
to the analysis of networks of political units and educational-
government networks. These concepts can be applied to the
NASA-Contractor relationship to describe and explain the nature
and dynamics of this relationship in the acquisition process^
and to evaluate alernative approaches that NASA can implement
to better manage this inter-organizational relationship.
While a comprehensive inter-organizational theory does not yet
exist, a number of concepts have been used to describe and
analyze inter-organizational relationships of various kinds.
However, observation of the NASA-Contractor decision process
and prior analytical studies of the NASA and DOD acquisition
process (Scherer, Hunt, Fox, Logistics Management Institute)
enable us to identify the most applicable concepts.
Concepts for Describing Network Linkages
This set of concepts incorporates those inter-organizational
dimensions which describe the basic setting, purpose, and pro-
cedures of the network relationship, including: [See Benson,
Evan, Warren, J. Thompson]
1. Organizational Set/Network Set
2. Goals and Goal Congruence
3. Domains and Domain Consensus
4. Leadership and Authority Structure
5. Work Coordination
6. Technical-Ideological Consensus
7. Dynamic Nature of the Relationship
Organizational Set is defined as the set of organizations which
constitutes a given organization environment, including members
of the network and other organizations which influence the avail-
ability of resources or decision making patterns in the network
[Evan], in the case of the NASA-Contractor relationship, the
organizational set includes scientific and engineering groups and
societies, Congress, OMB, GAO, users (such as COMSAT, 'the Weather
Bureau), and other contractors and subcontractors. The signifi-
cance of the extra-network organizational set is that it is the
source of. all resources available for aerospace contracting and
can control the exchange process through setting priorities,
program review and funding control. The definition of the
organizational set provides a basis for identifying all pos-
sible sources of inter-organizational activity, interaction,
and influence that impact on the NASA-Contractor network
relationship. Some categorizations of the major dimensions
of such interactions are provided by Benson, and by Evans of
which the following appear significant in describing the NASA-
Contractor relationship:
a.. Resource Concentration - NASA resources come
primarily from Congress. Utilization of these
resources is subject to close scrutiny by OMB.
Consequently, these organizations are most
dominant in the NASA-Contractor organizational
environment.
b. Network Autonomy Over Joint Activities - This
tends to exist only in low-cost, less visible
projects and where external "users" are not
involved.
c. Environmental Control Mechanisms - Regarding
selection, definition,and funding of projects
exist in terms of: science community pressure
for various types of projects; congressional
pressure regarding project selection and fund-
ing; OMB funding controls; GAO review of program
management and contracts, user specifications.
d. Overlapping Functions - Technology diffusion to
contractors and users is leading to the creation
of potential competition for NASA on certain
types of applications missions.
e. Overlapping Goals, Values, Professional Membership
Among Personnel - Communication and pattern of
interactions that may lead to selection of priori-
ties for scientific and technological advancements
and approaches occur among government, industry,
univers-itiesv -us'er scientists^ and'- engineer.
f. Potential Coalition Formation - Due to economic,
political, or professional objectives exists.
Although probably less pronounced than in DOD,
coalitions between key congressional leaders and
contractors or scientists may develop leading to
pressures on NASA program policies.
Goals and Goal Congruence - Goal congruence refers to the level
of agreement among members as to the inclusive goals to be
achieved [Stern]. NASA goals include the accomplishment of tech-
nical mission performance, on schedule, within the scope of
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funding constraints. Contractor goals include the development
of reliable systems to meet missions needs while achieving
certain financial goals. In NASA, contracts are the basic
mechanisms set up to achieve both technical and business goal
consensus. The adequacy of the contract in making joint goals
consistent with each unit's goal is a fundamental dimension
influencing the NASA-Contractor relationship.
Domain is a concept reflecting the boundaries claimed by an
organization regarding the scope of its activities [J. Thompson].
Domain consensus reflects the level of agreement among network
members on the appropriate division of work activities and areas
of responsibility appropriate to the achievement of network goals.
As a practical matter,. while contractors are primarily responsible
for performance and NASA is responsible for project definition and
supervision, there is a significant overlap in domains due to
formal and informal interactions. Contractors frequently parti-
cipate in definition of technical approaches and specifications,
and may even assist in selling the project to Congress and
external agencies. NASA may insist on the adoption of technical
methods, testing levels, or use of government specified or govern-
ment furnished equipment, and may interfere in the management of
subcontractors. Accordingly, a good deal of overlap in domains
may occur.
The problem of domain consensus is complicated by two fundamental
organizational motivations. Contractor motivations are heavily
weighted toward maintaining a "mastery" [Hunt] or control over
their organizations' activities and destiny. NASA is motivated
to assure timely and quality performance in order to meet the
expectations of external organizations. These forces are likely
to impede domain consensus to the extent that joint goals can be
achieved without a perfect division of labor and responsibility.
In effect, duplication or supplementary efforts may result.
Structure of Leadership and Authority Within Networks - Sayles
and Chandler have suggested that R&D networks are more egalitarian
than hierarchical due to science and professional values which
stress equal status for equal technical competence. Additionally,
the NASA-Contractor relationship is marked by significant dis-
tinctions in business requirements. Private industry is con-
strained by the fiscal need to achieve target levels of sales,
profit and return on investments while NASA (as a government
agency) desires to minimize the financial outlays necessary to
achieve a goal. The basis for cooperation, then is primarily
technical achievement in these networks, while in others (such as
manufacturer-retailer distribution systems), joint profit moti-
vations are operative. It is possible that hierarchi^l networks
are more likely to surface where network members possess more
similar fiscal management requirements such that coordination of
financial resource generation processes is possible. As a
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consequence, in R&D networks, authority is primarily centered
at the organization level and network leadership is limited
to definition of program objectives. The ability to effect
further control over network relationships is (as we shall
see below) a function of other bases for power.
Work Coordination refers to the degree of effectiveness and
efficiency in coordination and collaborations within the net-
work [Benson]. NASA's extraordinarily high level of project
success in terms of attaining mission objectives seems to
testify to a high level of achieved effectiveness. Analysis
of cost overruns, however, leads to a more varied record of
success measured in terms of efficiency. This may reflect
lack of domain consensus [leading to duplication of effort] as
well as other factors to be discussed below.
Ideological/Technical Consensus refers to the level of agree-
ment in the nature of a task and/or on appropriate approaches
to accomplishing tasks [Benson].:' The selection of technological
approaches, specification levels, documentation and confidence
testing practices, and use of standard and/or government furnished
equipment are among the issues where consensus may be lacking.
While technical consensus is promoted by informal-_-interaction
between NASA and co~ntrac-t~o~r technical personnel throughout the
acquisition process,'the imposition of business requirements by
NASA may impact the ability to achieve consensus. That is,
technical consensus is more readily (but not necessarily) achieved
where technical/cost trade-offs are minimal.
Dynamic Nature - Changes in the nature of network linkages occur
as the acquisition process moves from project conceptualization
through implementation due to:
o Changes in extra-network constraints on the scope
and funding of projects;
o Changes in inter-organizational management strategy,
as the specific environment and objectives of each
organization change for each stage of life cycle;
o Changes in inter-organizational decision points and
in key interfacing, personnel (particularly in NASA).
In particular, as Sayles and Chandler note, the relative importance
of business and technical goals tends to oscillate over the life
cycle.
Concepts for Analyzing Network Outcomes
Stern et. al. have suggested four variables as being highly mean-
ingful as a basis for conceptualizing the connections or structure
of inter-organizational relations:
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1. Power - The capability an organization possesses
for effecting the outcome of another organization.
2. Comparison Level - The standard against which the
member evaluates the "attractiveness" of the rela-
tionship. Each member has a standard set of goals
to be achieved in a relationship and this concept
indicates what these are (for purposes of refer-
ence) .
3. Comparison Level of Alternatives - The "opportunity
cost" of foregoing one relationship in order to
engage in another. This reflects the lowest level
of anticipated outcomes a member will accept given
the current environment.
4. Intensity - The degree of involvement in the rela-
tionship. This is primarily a function of two
factors which express the energy level of the rela-
tionship: frequency of interaction and size of
resouces investment.(Marrett)-
For purposes of studying NASA-Contractor relationship outcomes,
several component factors of these variables are considered.
Intensity - The NASA-Contractor relationship is one of recip-
rocal interdependence in that both members employ some degree
of mutual adjustment in order to achieve coordination (J.
Thompson). The perceived degree of interdependence reflects
the relative perception of members as to the extent to which
each is dependent upon the other ;(Stern) .
In general it appears that a relatively high level of inter-
dependence exists. As we have suggested above, the two units
are generally autonomous and have disparate business goals.
Consequently, work coordination and development of technology
and domain consensus are the basic points which demand inter-
action and mutual adjustment. Where projects are highly defined
and specified in the early stages, interaction is much lower
than for projects where uncertain technological achievements
are required. However, interdependence increases over time -
particularly after the contract award - as work coordination
and funding flows become more dominant, leading to increased
frequency of contacts. Further, the amount of resources (funds,
manpower, technology) devoted to the relationship increases
over the life cycle.
Consequently, in large-scale R&D contracts, the level of
uncertainty, frequency of contact, and large amount of resources
involved lead to a relationship of high intensity.
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In addition, Jacob's concept of .essentiality appears appropriate
here. The provision of resources and programs by agencies
such as NASA are essential to the aerospace industry contractor
in order to develop hardware items. Similarly, the existence
of aerospace contractors with technology and manpower to devel-
op systems is essential to the functioning of NASA programs.
Consequently, each party has resources vital to the other, such
that the degree of involvement of both parties is generally
high.
Permanency of the Relationship aiid Availability of Alternatives -
Permanency of the relationship refers to the perception as to
the length of time the units will continue to act as a network
(Stern). Increased perception of permanency will lead to greater
cooperative effects'as general rule. (This assumes also that
both members perceive the relationship as beneficial). The
perception of a more permanent relationship will increase to the
extent that: NASA is unwilling to drop a contractor after an
award is made; the project is complex and long-term in scope;
expectation of related follow-on work is high; the contractor
has unique capabilities in the specific type of work or tech-
nology such that future contracts will be awarded. Also, con-
tractors who have a larger percentage of this business allocated
to NASA activity are more likely to perceive a more permanent
relationship.
Counterbalancing such forces is the notion that each party may
view the current project as a unique relationship. Future
awards are not certain in NASA (since production contracts are
rare and past performance is seldom the major criterion in source
selection), and even where the expectation of receiving future
awards is high, project and program managers for both members are
likely to change. In general, then, perceived permanency is
likely to be most closely measured by the expected time frame
for the current contract.
Mot i va: tional: --::-Investment - The greater the stake of one member
in continuing a relationship and the 'greater the commitment to
the performance of the joint activity, the higher the motivational
investment of that member (Emerson). Both parties will have some
motivational investment in the relationship in terms of the tech-
nical accomplishment of the tasks. This is uniquely important
in networks which are based on a technical/professional relation-
ship. NASA's investment, however, is likely to be stronger due
to the impact of a failure to achieve technical goals on the
organization's relationship with its extra-network organizational
set (users, Congress, cognizant agencies and the public). Failure
to complete highly visible projects has a particularly high threat
potential for losing resource inputs and for the application of
external controls on, the work process.
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Compari son Levels - Prior to the award of a contract, NASA gen-
erally has the option of interacting with a number of propective
bidders, so several alternative sources exist. Similarly, each
contractor can evaluate the opportunity costs (if any) of fore-
going one contract to bid aggressively on-a second contract and
to determine if a given contract opportunity is sufficiently
attractive to enter into a relationship. Particularly in a period
of time where contractors are operating below capacity levels,
however, it would appear that contractors are relatively dependent
on NASA during the pre-award stages.
Subsequent to the award, however, NASA's reluctance to reopen
competition or terminate a project suggests the lack of substi-
tutability of contractors. This suggests a need to maintain the
attractiveness of the relationship to contractors and to maintain
contractor motivational investment in the relationship to assure
continuity of the relationship through completion. (Note that
even in the event of a termination, contractors receive payment
for all authorized work completed.)
Dependence on Extra-network Forces - As suggested in an earlier
section,financial resources flow into the network from environ-
mental agencies. Further, these agencies have a certain degree
of control over operating relationships within the network.
NASA is constrained by budgetary and program approval processes
of federal agencies and by the limitations of scientific community
and public support. Additionally, reimbursable 'programs funded
wholly or in part by other "users" influence NASA decisions.
Maintenance of technical and schedule.performance thus becomes a
major priority for NASA management on approved programs, while
demonstration of cost-effective impact is the major priority for
projects in the pre-approval stages.
This process may result in over-optimistic initial cost estimates
followed by descoping, schedule slippages, redefinition and/or
increased reliability testing at later stages. Cost overruns
and budgetary re-allocation often result.
Contractors are influenced by public approbation, demands of
"other business", the ability to gain access to money markets,
and the ability to use technical gains to obtain future work.
Consequently, maintaining capability, good technical performance,
and obtaining some minimal contribution to overhead and profit
are primary considerations.
Additionally, external organizations impose restrictions on the
timing of budgetary flows, methods for competition, acceptability
of costs, and other factors governing the relationship.
Asymmetry in Risks and Rewards
Asymmetry in network relationships reflects the degree to
which the relative risks and rewards allocated to the net-
work members are perceived as unbalanced such that joint
cooperative action benefits one party more than the other
(Stern). The difficulty in dividing balanced risks and
rewards is largely a function of the level of uncertainty in
a project in terms of: unforeseen costs, unknown technical
problems, changes in contractor environment and capacity, or
uncertainty over NASA's potential use of options to buy in
multiple units (where applicable).
In addition to the inherent uncertainty in developing large-
scale systems, constraints in both organizations result in
a significant tendency by both parties to minimize risk in
the network. In NASA, it has been traditional for project
and program managers to primarily focus on system technical
performance in risk minimization, with schedule performance
also being significant in projects with critical "launch
windows" (such as inter-planetary projects). Cost and budget
risk have historically been secondary concerns.
Conferaetor.s-r, attempt to minimize risks in two areas, financial
and technical. Poor system performance damages the contractor's
credibility with NASA, with other possible clients, and with
the general public and investment community. Consequently,
high reliability is a major objective- , Similarly, the con-
tractor manager responsible for a project will normally
attempt to avoid any loss, as this may be interpreted as a
failure of management capability within the organization.
Interaction of the risk avoidance motives of both parties
frequently leads to the following:
NASA is willing to raise target cost and accept
or initiate changes for higher reliability;
Both sides are reluctant to control reliability
and confidence testing;
NASA is unwilling to invoke cost ceilings and will
apply additional funding on overruns (which is known
by contractors);
In sum, interactions regarding risk and reward trade-offs between
members tend to lead to increased emphasis on technical performance
outcomes.
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Relative Visibility of Goals and Activities
Visibility represents the degree to which each party can obtain
timely knowledge of the goals, activities, processes, constraints,
or accomplishments of the other member of the network.
In general, contractors have a decided advantage in visibility
due to close inter-organizational ties to NASA personnel and
to agencies (such as OMB) which monitor NASA activities. In
addition, much of the information desired about any government
agency must be open due to public record requirements. More
specifically:
- NASA project priorities are made visible incthe
RFP;
NASA technicians interact with industry counter-
parts in developing technical plans;
NASA budget information becomes known, enabling
contractors to adjust price estimates to the
NASA cost target;
- Contractors can (and must) tie work to funding
schedules.
NASA visibility, on the other hand, is impeded by:
- Need to assess priorities of many contractors in
preaward stage (while contractors need only analyze
one organization);
Reliance on contractor past performance or pre-
liminary studies by contractors for many cost
estimates;
- Inconsistency in accounting systems across con-
tractors and across projects (especially in indirect
and overhead costs);
Reliance onooutside agencies (DCAS) for auditing at
contractor site;
Time-lag on reports from contractor;
Uncertainty about contractor's motivations to trade-
off incentive profit for manpower or capacity utili-
zation, or to trade-off incentive or award fees on
one dimension (e.g. cost) for fees on other dimensions
(schedule, performance).
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Strategic Position
To the extent that one member of the network performs._an
activity which is critical to network performance, that
member posesses power since that activity will determine
(at least in part) the network outcome. Strategic position
is a reflection of the domains mapped out by each party.
As suggested earlier, the basic domain of NASA concerns
project definition and performance evaluation, while con-
tractors are primarily responsible for implementation.
However, these boundaries are not always clear cut. Where
technical and performance specification and cost targets are
clear, precise, and thoroughly developed, then NASA's strategic
positional power is enhanced. However, to the extent that
initial specifications are influenced by contractors, call
for new technology or are overly optimistic about performance,
then contractors will have greater power, in that performance
outcomes will be largely a function of contract implementation
since original specifications become meaningless.
In general, the greater the uncertainties involved in a proj-
ect, the greater the positional power which derives from
implementation as opposed to specification and evaluation
activity.
Two additional points should be noted. First, the matter of
who performs a function is relevant primarily because of a
disparity in goals. If both parties are concerned solely with
technical performance, outcomes are likely to be minimally
affected by a shift in^domains. Second, an overlap in domains
(such as specifications, direction of subcontractors, or con-
tractor initiated changes) may or may not lower system per-
formance directly, but may contribute to conflict.
Dominance and Conflict
This section has identified two sets of inter-organization
factors useful in understanding the acquisition process in
NASA. The first set described the general linkages that
exist in the NASA-Contractor relationship. The second set
reveals the dimensions which must be analyzed to determine
the nature of a specific inter-organizational relationship.
That is, when the general linkages are combined with the
specific NASA environment, contractor environment, and proj-
ect uncertainties, it should be possible to evaluate the
specific NASA-Contractor relationship for a given acquisition
along these eight analytical dimensions.
These eight dimensions, in turn, provide inferences as to:
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the relative power of each party to influence
the outcomes of the relationship (in terms of
each party's achievement of its goals);
the amount of inter-organizational conflict that
will result if either party perceives a serious
threat to its ability to achieve its goals.
This second set of dimensions, therefore, represent those
elements of the relationship toward which inter-organizational
strategy will be directed.
Figure I portrays the relationships among these dimensions.
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Inter-organizational strategy is the development of inter-
organizational activities and decisions designed to improve
the relative dominance of a given network member and/or
reduce network conflict.
Six basic strategy approaches are presented:
1. Extra-network power strategies
2. Strategic network positioning strategies
3. Visibility strategies
4. Interpenetration strategies
5. Economic power strategies
6. Bargaining-negotiation strategies
It should be noted that such strategies may not be mutually
exclusive. They may be used in tandem, or, owing to the life
cycle nature of many inter-organizational relationships, they
may be used sequentially.
Further, it should be noted, that the term "strategy" is used
in a relatively broad sense. Sayles and Chandler (p. 70)
distinguished "contextual designs" for achieving managerial
control from "strategies" for stimulating desired responses or
performances. The former involve factors (such as dependency)
reflecting the context or setting of a relationship. The use
of such designs involves activities influencing orientation,
commitment, and responsiveness of the other organization.
Strategy (in their view) is an attempt to pre-program actual
decisions via some specified stimulus.
The term strategy, as used in the present study, incorporates
both of the foregoing concepts on the assumption that both
represent some managerial action design to achieve an objective.
That is, strategy will incorporate activities which are designed
to modify the overall context of the relationship (e.g., by
influencing intensity, or relative visibility) as well as those
activities designed to evoke specific responses (such as
establishing cost incentive fees).
1. Extra-Network Power Strategies
Strategies for minimizing dependence and increasing power may
be focused on the organization sets of the network members.
Specific alternatives within this set of strategies include
the following:
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a) Seek prestige - Organizational prestige (a,s-
conferred, by organi,zati.Qns_.Qf_p.ubXicg . in^ .the. environment)"
may pr.pyi.de "at,-:lea,'s.t--a-.partiral basis. ..for. power- (J. Thompson).
Contractors may obtaiin prestige .through, professional
citations.or public-approbation regarding.technical expertise,
performance, and capability. -'. Similarly, -NASA..obtains prestige,
through -public acceptance of" and intere'sV in its programs,
through, professional .support, of the. science and engineering
communities^, and '^ (.historically) ; through Congressional and
Wh'ifee House support.
b) Seek new resource bases - Broadening the resource
base by finding new uses and users will reduce reliance on
existing members of the organizational set. This may involve:
finding new sponsors for space experiments; finding users for
existing programs or hardware who can be brought into the pro-
grams at variable costs; finding support for developing tech-
nology with potential commercial applications.
c) Manipulative strategies - Organizations may attempt
to influence agencies or publics in the organizational set of
the other network member in order to place pressure on a given
member and thus gain power (Benson). While NASA has quite
limited options in this area, contractors may attempt to
influence resource generating or resource monitoring agencies
(Congress, OMB, GAO, Users) to force changes in program prior-
ities, commitments, or funding in NASA, or to force review of
NASA decisions regarding contract awards, cost reimbursement,
or domain activities. The mere threat of such actions may be
sufficient to prompt reconsideration of NASA policies or
decisions.
d) Authoritative strategies - One option available (in
theory) to NASA is to obtain the formal support of an environ-
mental organization regarding a given policy (Benson). For
instance, obtaining Congressional, GAO, or OMB support for
policies regarding low-cost practices, reporting requirements,
types of contracts to be used, auditing practices, allowable
costs, etc. may facilitate the ability to implement a given
policy, thus increasing power by formalizing and/or re-organ-
izing the structure of inter-organizational relations.
2. Strategies for strategic network positioning
This group of strategies is designed to minimize dependence
through extending the organization's dominance over the inter-
organizational linkages in the network. More specifically,
this group includes the following strategies:
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a) Precise specifications of project requirements -
Improved project definition at an early stage in the relation-
ship will increase the dependency of the contractor and reduce
the uncertainty on the technical approaches and bases for
performance evaluation. Early definition of tight technical
specifications, cost effective testing requirements, and
specified cost, technical and schedule performance require-
ments decrease dependence on contractors. Further the develop
ment of realistic cost estimates and related funding ceilings
reduces contractor options on work coordination strategies .
Excessive optimism in NASA's in-house cost estimates (to
"sell" a project) , and reliance on past contractor cost per-
formance (without regard to efficiency evaluation) increase
NASA dependency in cost definition. One argument against
tight specifications is that they reduce innovation by con-
tractors. TheVuseXoff design: to-xcost; policies is one- method
"
b) Domain strategies - Domain strategies involve either
the takeover of more network functions or the exercise of
greater discretion in contrasting functions. Dependence is
minimized to the extent that the domain incorporates all
activities except those which (Sayles & Chandler) :
- have only a short-run impact
- do not inhibit future competition
- do not make NASA technically dependent
- are too costly for in-house resources
- individually have a small impact on the system
- are not core functions essential to the organization
Contractors with excess capacity and manpower may expand their
domain in order to achieve control over operations. NASA policy
is generally oriented to minimizing in-house activity to the
extent that performance will not be impaired either in the short-
run or long-run. As a consequence, contractor domain strategies
are expansive in general while NASA's are protectionist. Activi-
ties which appear to be in the discretionary zone for NASA
include those where matching responsibility issues are significant,
Systems integration, subsystem testing, direction of sub-con-
tractors, mandating of government furnished and standard equip-
ment, and retention -of* approval over^suficontracting -arrangements
are activities which, if pursued by NASA, result in reduced
contractor responsibility. However, decreased NASA dependence
due to employing domain strategies may be offset by a decrease
in contractor motivational investment or by the adoption of other
contractor power strategies of an extra-network or economic
nature .
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3. Visibility strategies
NASA's dependency can be decreased by increasing visibility
over work coordination activities, thus helping to maintain
adherence to performance standards. Standardization of work
breakdown structures, reports, indirect cost allocation methods,
and overhead charges, improving the speed and accuracy of
audits, and increasing the frequency of key contractor reports
are vehicles for improving visibility and thus at least partially
creating the "self-operating system of control" suggested by
Sayles and Chandler.
Additionally, improved analysis of and awareness of contractor
motivations and strategies facilitates the ability to identify
anticipated contractor activities regarding work and performance
priorities. Periodic evaluations of all performance dimensions
would provide additional visibility useful in minimizing
dependence. (This is a supplemental advantage of award fee
contracts which are discussed later).
With regard to formal financial reporting systems for monitor-^
ing cost and schedule progress, several kinds of problems have
been experienced.
Such reports may overload the system (especially
on large projects where PERT is being used) with
an unmanageable volume of information.
Required reporting formats may be incompatible
with contractors' internal systems, thus adding
to the cost of reports and perhaps reducing their
accuracy.,
In complex systems acquisitions, such reports may
be prepared two or three levels away from the work-
ing level, resulting in a large time lag.
Such reports do not reflect technical problems
currently being encountered which, if unsolved,
will lead to cost and schedule problems later.
As a consequence, frequent face-to-face reviews at the management
and technical working level are often required to identify tech-
nical problems at an early point in time. Such reviews often lead
to technical intervention and direction from NASA, a condition
which may conflict with the contractor's desire to maintain a
"mastery" over his technical operations.
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4. Interpenetration strategies
This class of inter-organizational strategies includes activities
designed to increase intensity and motivational investment in the
network relationship by reducing uncertainty, increasing inter-
action, or increasing consensus on network goals and tasks.
Three types of interpenetration strategy can be identified.
a) Informal boundary spanning activities - Boundary spanning
personnel are individuals involved in informal or formal relation-
ships with personnel in other network organizations. Informal
activities of these personnel include contractor marketing activ-
ities, informal negotiation of disputes, and shared decision-
making on contract implementation procedures. Such personal commu-
ications activities (which are educational or propagandizing in
nature) may assist in developing inter-organizational awareness
of joint problems and lead to increased motivational investment
(Stern). Further, boundary activities of technical personnel may
lead to the substitution of professional group pressures for
formal standards of performance (Sayles & Chandler) . Obtaining
insight into the needs and styles of the other organization and
increasing inter-organizational identification are direct conse-
quences of informal boundary activities and facilitate decision-
making and coordination at the project definition and implemen-
tation stages (Hunt & Rubin, pp. 304-306).
b) Coopting strategies - Cooptation is the process of
absorbing elements from one organization into the decision-making
structure of another organization, to increase the likelihood of
future support and thus reduce uncertainty (Thompson). NASA may
attempt to coopt contractors by involving them in the design of
RFP's and technical specif ications:,--defih'i-tion--of ineentive" 'systems
and control systems, and designation of cost-effective practices.
A related inter-organizational adaptation that may occur is the
absorption of leadership by expertise. That is, in the contract
implementation phase, on project manager may become the "de facto"
manager of both organizations due to special skills, experience,
or knowledge of the technical tasks to be performed. In effect
this ability to control or guide task performance generates a
shift in power - often toward the contractor - as a result of task
interactions (Hunt & Rubin, p. 300).
The acquisition of such leadership is generally not one of
organizational policy, but derives from the need for task guidance
and from interactions between project managers. This inter-
penetration thus facilitates either the contractor's ability to
use the government project personnel in "selling" changes or NASA's
ability to control technical/cost trade-offs.
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c) Coalescing - involves the development of an unusually
close relationship similar to the creation of a joint venture
(Thompson). This requires the development of high goal consensus
with agreement and commitment to future joint decision-making
where the impact of the achievement will result in strong
approbation of extra-network forces. Typically, this means
submersion of all goals, save the one major joint objective, and
will rarely be effective. However,'-,.when available it assures a
high degree of intensity and motivational investment.
5. Economic Power strategies
Economic power strategies are designed to minimize dependence
through the application of economic forces (such as maintaining
competitive pressures, applying cost and funding controls, and
utilization of incentives and performance evaluations) which
maintain control over risk and reward structures in the network.
In particular, the objective of such strategies is to assure that
each party accepts an appropriate level of economic risk commen-
surate with performance. The achievement of economic1 power,
therefore, would mean that the member with relative power has
the dominant ability to control the flow of resources and allocation
of risks.
In the NASA-contractor relationship, this means that NASA must
seek economic power through its ability to award contracts, its
control over the funding available to distribute to contractors,
and its ability to control performance through selection of type
of contract. Contractors must seek economic power by attempting
to influence NASA's selection of a contractor and of a type of
contract, and by the way in which it structures its performance
to earn revenue, and to take advantage of funding controls and
incentive and award fees.
Further, strategies for economic power are dynamic in that they
involve interrelated activities and decisions at various stages
of the life cycle. Additionally, the selection of strategies must
also consider the full range of motives and priorities of both
parties in a given network as well as the degree of uncertainty
involved.
a) Competitive strategies - involve the degree to which
NASA can obtain economic power through using the pressure of
competition among contractors to achieve motivation for'-excel-
lent technical, schedule, and cost performance. Contractor
strategies will be designed to maximize NASA dependence by
maximizing the firm's differential competitive advantage.
Among the options available to NASA in this class of strategies
are:
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- promoting parallel efforts to extend competition
through more than one stage of technical develop-
ment;
- use of recompetition on multiple buys of "standard"
equipment;
- reducing transfusion of information among contractors
and especially from the government through shorter
acquisition cycles and better orals techniques (Manage-
ment Study of NASA Acquisition Process);
- develop budget "and cost estimates which are realistic
rather than optimistic to obtain more competitive
price competition (Drake suggests that FPI contracts
often lead to estimates which are not correct, leading
to buy-ins and lack of price competition);
- be willing (and demonstrate willingness) to invoke
limitation of funds clause, and the threat of re-
opening competition to avert buy-ins (Fox);
- place heavy emphasis on' prior performance in contractor
selection process (Scherer, Hunt).
Contractor may attempt to avoid competitive pressure through:
- influencing technical specifications which match com-
pany capability;
- marketing efforts designed to generate more advantageous
evaluations of technical and management capability;
- obtain technical advantages to improve chances for
obtaining sole source or follow-on contracts, and
maintaining such advantages through control of tech-
nical transfusion for re-competition;
- competitive optimism (Scherer, Fox) on bidding and
anticipation of upward revision of NASA cost targets
and funding ceilings, of change orders which increase
costs, and the unwillingness of NASA to re-open
competition;
- maintain low visibility of cost growth in early stages
of a project to make the re-opening of competition
more difficult when cost growth becomes apparent to
NASA.
b) Automatic economic incentive strategies - The concept
of economic incentives generally reflects contractual incentives
which permit the contractor to earn profit on some performance
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basis (Scherer) . Such, incentives may be of two basic types.
Automatic contractual incentives (incentive fees) correlate
the amount and/or rate of profit with contractor performance
on a pre-arranged formula. After-the-fact incentives (award
fees) provide a rate or amount of profit based on formal
evaluation of contractor performance after the work (or portions
of the work) have been completed.
Additionally, a variety of contractor motivations will be
operating on contractors. Certain motivations for good per-
formance tend to exist even in the absence of contract
incentives. Accordingly, the design of an economic power
strategy should consider the relationship between contractual
incentive structures and existing motivations.
In particular, selection of an automatic incentive approach by
NASA should incorporate explicit consideration of the follow-
ing factors:
1) Contractors emphasize quality and schedule performance
because they believe that poor performance on these dimensions
will lead to loss of future awards (user costs) and because of
the concern of technical personnel with technology advancement
and high reliability (Scherer, Hunt). User costs are probably
less significant in NASA business due to fewer production
contracts, less formal performance evaluation in the SEE
smaller sales potential, and less likelihood of program termi-
nation for poor performance due to greater criticality of
schedules. User costs may also be significant if the loss of
skilled personnel is feared. Consequences of these factors
are:
- probable redundancy of incentives on technical
performance and schedule performance;
- the tendency to maximize use of manpower by avoid-
ing subcontracting and by maximizing the number of
technical tasks;
- emphasis on reliability testing.
Some substantiation of this argument is provided by Parker and
Belden. In a comprehensive study of Air. Force contracts, they
conclude that:
- contractors tend to earn performance incentives
regardless of contract cost outcomes;
- underruns tend to be associated with early product
delivery and overruns tend to be associated with
late product delivery.
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Further, Hunt, Rubin, and Perry Cpp. 256-257) found that know-
ledge of contract incentives seldom extends below top manage-
ment and, even then, is typically restricted to awareness of
performance and schedule incentives.
2) Diminishing marginal utility of profit - Contractor
managers are more likely to be rewarded for factors other than
contract profit once losses are avoided and minimal acceptable
profit levels are attained. Consequently, increased profit may
not offset user costs, disutilities, or the political and
customer repercussions of large profit percentages.
The-xParker and Belden finding the CPIF contracts actually
averaged larger overruns than GPFF contracts may lend further
support to the argument that profit maximization is not a
paramount contractor goal in the short run.
3) Wide cost incentive ranges - around target costs mean
that incremental rewardssfor each dollar of cost savings are
perceived as low. However, if cost ranges are too narrow where
target costs are unreal i&tdrevf-t he•number of cost levels with no
incentive (both above and below target)" is increased. Multi-
dimensional incentives tend to have limited cost ranges,
increasing the need for tight cost estimates (Scherer). CPIF
contracts typically have cost ranges of approximately plus or
minus 25% of target cost.
Clearly,cthe ability to effectively utilize such contract
types to achieve an effective incentive range will be closely
tied to the accuracy of the target cost estimate. Yet the
rationale for cost-plus contracts assumes that such estimates
are bound to be risky.
4) Cash flow - Where a contractor has severe cash flow needs,
use of delivery incentives may lead to excessive responsiveness.
Contractors may shorten test cycles, apply overtime, or risk
performance against the attainment of such incentives.
5) Contractor cost share above target cost - The percentage
cost share faced by a contractor may not be an incentive to hold
down costs.
- If cash flow needs are great, the contractor cost
share represents cheap interest for quick cash.
(A 15% cost share may approximate a contractor's
cost of capital - and the principle need not be
repaid);
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- If the percentage of the overrun which, goes to
fixed costs and reduced tax burdens exceeds the
contractor share, the net contribution to over-
head and profit is enhanced by overrunning.
Implication for the use of incentive fee's by NASA include the
following:
- Design multiple incentives only where incentive
ceilings that avoid contractor control over per-
formance direction can be achieved,
- Design incentives which minimize desirability
of trade-offs of incentive profits for overhead coverage,
- Design incentives which stimulate cost saving
investments (Logistics Management Institute,
Fox) ,
- Control the re-investment of any underrun dollars
by program offices and avoid cost targets with an,
underrun bias so cost savings are not illusory.
c) After the fact reward strategies - Since contractors
have user costs and disutilities which may limit the effective-
ness of cost incentives, they may have the motivation to bargain
for incentive structures which reduce the risk of losses and
which support technical and schedule performance. Correlating
profit with contractor performance on a prearranged formula,
however, assumes that shortrun profit is the primary contractor
motivation. If this is not the case, incentives may not lead
to the acquisition of economic power. In fact, if contractors
are successful in bargaining for risk-aversive share ratios and
cost ceilings and for desirable and attainable performance and
schedule incentives, economic power flows away from NASA —
particularly where cost estimates are poor, change orders are
probable, and the likelihood of maintaining cost targets and
ceilings through termination threats are small (Scherer, Pace,
Hunt).
Alternatively, Scherer, Hunt and Fox have argued for FP contracts
where cost estimates are tight or for after-the-fact performance
evaluation systems. The award fee concept, in which NASA will
unilaterally evaluate performance against the RFP requirements
and priorities (at milestones and at project completion) is an
economic power strategy which is consistent with the after-the-
fact evaluation argument.
While award fees do not provide complete control over contractor
performance they may provide greater incentive on the cost
dimension while reducing the contractor's ability to manipulate
incentive structures, since profit will be more a function of
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performance than of bargaining and costing. Further, they
permit re-direction of performance objectives where NASA
requirements shift over-time. Key problems in implementing
such awards are (Scherer, Pace):
- the ability to clearly define relative priority
of objectives;and to employ only a few dimensions;
- subjectivity and consistency in applying awards;
- administrative costs;
- if contractors must accept more risk in terms of
performance rewards they will bargain for more
flexibility and fewer controls (Sayles, Chandler,
p. 283) .
In addition, successful use of award fees may be enhanced if:
- the relative basis for fees (among cost, schedule,
technical dimensions) is varied over time in response
to performance?and is related to the contractor's own plans;
- performance periods are differentially weighted such
that early periods receive heavier emphasis, since
these periods are critical in establishing performance
patterns-(with a significant bonus for final performance);
- contractor motivation is maintained in spite of early
sub-par performance by preserving "lost" award fees
for potential "catch-up" performance later;
- award fees are paid at the end of each performance
period thus enhancing the contractor's ability to
increase cash flow through good performance;
- contractor top management is kept informed about award
fee evaluations. The award fee is frequently used as
a "report card" on the contractor program manager, so
a cut in award fees may generate greater attention to
a problem.
d) Disruptive strategies - when a power imbalance in-an
existing relationship is significant and permits the party with
dominant power to ignore internal conflict, one organization may
invoke a distruptive strategy consisting of activities designed
to threaten the resource generating capacity of the target
organization through domain violation, fund diversion, or program
circumvention XBenson).
The ability to invoke such a strategy requires the availability
of alternative exchange channels and a minimal motivational
investment in the inter-organizational relatiosnhip. Due to
the risks (to NASA) involved in program termination or attempts
to re-open competition, the utility of such strategies will
likely be confined to contractors - and then, only in cases
where visibility control systems are poor and expectations of
future contract award losses are small.
However, under conditions of severe conflict, poor controls,
and inadequate economic incentives, it is possible that a
contractor might allow schedule slippages, incur excessive
testing, manpower, or overhead costs or engage in slipshod
management of subcontractors to either deliberately embarass
NASA managers, to attempt to recoup perceived imbalances in
risk/reward trade-offs by the generation of greater total
revenues and work, or to force a revision in contractual terms.
6. Bargaining and negotiation strategies
Bargaining and negotiation primarily occur in the fourth and
fifth stages of the acquisition life cycle and are heavily
intertwined with other stages for two reasons. First, bargaining
is the mechanism by which certain economic strategies or
visibility strategies are implemented. Negotiations of price
and contract terms, change procedures, acceptability of reports,
prices, acceptance of changes, and bases for fees are illustrative
of this interconnection. Secondly, the range of bargaining
strategies available is restricted by the implementation of prior
strategies, and the selection of strategies is restricted by the
results of prior bargaining (especially in stage four). For
instance, the effectiveness of contractor strategies to control
incentive fees, to earn supplemental revenue from changes, and
to delay reports or documentation will be limited by the bargaining
outcomes of stage four of the life cycle.
The use of the term bargaining strategy, therefore, focuses on
the approaches used to gain power, reduce dependency, or increase
the intensity of the relationship through the negotiation of
procedures for implementing other strategy components (i.e.,
for implementing a visibility strategy, an incentive strategy,
etc.).
The ability to implement a negotiation strategy is determined by
three major factors: (Contract Management Institute)
1. Organizational structure and informal bargainin
power,
-42-
2. Institutional forces and economic bargaining
power,
3. Decision-making patterns of negotiators.
In the case of NASA, these might be illustrated as follows:
Informal power accrues to the contractor for organi-
zational reasons when:
1. NASA negotiators don't have full support of
NASA top management;
2. NASA negotiating team has disagreement on
priorities;
3. The contractor negotiator is more experienced
and of higher status;
4. The contractor has extensive supporting cost data;
&. NASAceost. model is not fully accepted by NASA nego-
tiating team;
6. Close ties exist between contractor and project
personnel on NASA negotiating team.
Institutional forces influence-"bargaining power to the
extent that:
1. The contractor has significant need for the contract;
2. The contractor has other contracts available;
3. NASA has alternate contractors available;
4. The contract is highly profitable;
5. Cost targets are tight, (i.e. reasonably certain);
6. The threat of contract cancellation is small;
7. The contractor size is very large or very small;
8. The program is designated as urgent by NASA.
Decision-making patterns are significant factors to the
extent that:
1. NASA knows contractor motives from past contracts;
2. The contractor knows primary areas of expertise
of negotiating team;
3. Negotiators have heavy workloads and wish to speed
contract negotiations;
4. NASA contracting officer perceives a need for low
overhead dollars and low profit percentage;
5. Eithe"r.~party 'perceives -cost"'.targets -:as "r.iskyv '
CSee Pace, p. 540;. Bond; Fox 348-357; Logistics Management
Institute for elaboration).
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The total impact of these forces vrill indicate the relative
bargaining power of each party. Consequently, changes in
economic dependence or in within-organization factors can
influence bargaining.
Relative bargaining power, in turn, will reflect the range
of options available to either party. In general, the options
selected will be designed to minimize risk (Scherer, Hunt) by
both parties.
In NASA, strategies to reduce risk will take the form of
maximizing the contractors share of cost overruns, setting
tight cost ceilings, reducing sont^aetors'1, ability;-to-make
non-essential changes, minimizing the possibility of embar-
rassing overruns or underruns, and increasing the opportunity
for intervention on subcontracting, overhead charges, and
testing requirements.
Contractor strategies available include the following (Pace,
Fox, [Ch. 15], and Incentives Analysis, Inc.:)
1. Structure cost allocation to show low indirect
cost rates that appeal to contracting offer.
2. Obtain incentives permitting flexibility in
performance standards.
3. Attempt to tie funding to level of effort.
4. Obtain simplified control system by lowering
the price of compliance.
5. Obtain disclaimers of responsibility for follow-
on work.
6. Avoid cost saving investments.
7. Argue that due to high fixed costs, a small
percentage of cost is controllable.
8. Obtain language emphasizing "goals" rather than
"requirements".
9. Point out the risks involved in accepting mandatory
requirements where contract is CPIF.
10. Build in contingencies that can be "sacrificed".
11. On incentive contracts:
- if cost target has overrun bias, bargain for
low share ratios, high ceilings;
- if cost target has underrun bias, bargain for
high share ratios, accept lower ceilings;
- if cost targets are tight, bargain for loose
change provisions-.
12. Obtain change provisions- focusing on "allowable"
as opposed to "reasonable" costs.
13. Structure milestones and related progress payments
schedules in order to speed cash flow.
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CONCLUgrON
This paper has portrayed'-the 'NASA-Contractor relationship in
terms of an inter-organizational network. -Neither party makes
decisions in a vacuum. Rather, the organizations are involved,
in exchanges of resources, products, and information over time.
Each attempts to influence the business and technical outcomes
of the network through strategies of direct action and/or of
indirect activities which attempt to influence key elements in
the network's organizational environment^-
Prior applications of inter-organizational strategy have focused
on all-business networks (e.g. distribution channels) or all-
government networks (e.g. health agencies). By extending these
concepts to a business-government network, it may be inferred
that inter-organizational strategy is broadly applicable to a
variety of network and organizational situations.
While various strategy typologies are available, the six alter-
natives suggested in this paper demonstrate the range of strategic
approaches that may be employed individually or in combinations
over time. Further, by considering the variety of strategic
options available in terms of their impacts on the goals of
other network members, improved anticipation of reactive strategies
is facilitated. Where network relationships are at least
moderately durable and dynamic, such a contingency.management
approach appears essential to achieving desirable network out-
comes for each network member.
It is not coincidental that these strategy alternatives also
appear incthe conflict resolution literature. This reflects
the fact that in highly interdependent networks such as the
NASA-Contractor network, strategy selection decisions must
incorporate conflict management mechanisms if joint network
goals are to be achieved.
Joseph P. Guiltinan
Low Cost Systems Office
NASA Headquarters
June 14, 1976
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* - •y.'u.u. £." .^ .APPENDIX A
The Acquisition Life Cycle in NASA
The following flow charts summarize each stage of the acquisition
life cycle in terms of:
o Key elements in NASA decision process
o Key elements in contractor decision process
o Formal joint interaction elements
o Formal communication flows
o Informal communication and influence
Symbols;
- Activities and decisions
J- NASA cognizant management and within-NASA, outside
influencers
Indicate relationship among activities and decisions
f
>- Indicate formal communications
>- Indicate informal influences and communications flow
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APPENDIX B
THE NASA/CONTRACTOR DECISION PROCESS'
Stage I Project conceptualization and definition
A) NASA ..; , -: -_(-.r^.-._. •_• ' __•._';:.
Influences
1. NASA Objectives
2. NASA Resources
3. NASA Environment
-Science Community
-OMB
-Congress
-General Public
4. State of Technology
5. Program Office Needs/Goals
6. User Requirements
7. Centers Manpower Availability
8. Technical Interests and Activities
of Centers Technical Staff
Objectives
1. Contribute to NASA Mission
2. Meet User needs to get resources
3. Advance state of the art
4. Utilize center manpower
5. Facilitate cost estimation,
contractor selection § negotiation
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Cognizant Management
1. Center's Technical staff
2. Program Office
3. Science Principal Investigators
4. User Managers
5. Project Manager and Staff
Major Activities and Decisions
1. Level of in-house development
2. Use of Contractors for preliminary studies
3. Relative emphasis on payload instrumentation
vs vehicle hardware
4. Relative use of existing technology and
equipment vs advanced technology/equipment
5. Precision of technical specifications and
performance specifications
6. Degree to which contractor technical
suggestions are incorporated
B) Contractor [ • ' _ - ' ••
Environmental Analysis
1. Effects of a NASA proposed concept or development
on sales of contractor-developed or contractor
researched concepts/items/systems
2. Relative advantage possessed by competing con-
tractors in developing the proposed concept
due to technology, capacity, size, prior in-
dependent research and development (IR§D) or
preliminary, NASA-funded studies.
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3. Relative profitability of competing,
alternative concepts that might be advanced
Objectives
1. Develop understanding of proposed concept
and related technology.
2. Influence development of specifications to
fit contractor ability to compete.
3. Influence NASA evaluation of contractor's
technical understanding and capability.
Strategies
1. Develop informal relationships with cognizant
technical and management personnel
2. Market technical approaches
3. Market suggested cost/performance priorities
4. Gather information on NASA's proposed
technical approaches and project goals
5. Gather information on competitors' activities
and suggested technical approaches
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Stage 2 Procurement Plan g RFP Development
A) NASA ;k^ .sii 3 - : V .
Influences:
1. Degree of Definition in Project
f^J Objectives and Technical Specification
2. Required level of technological advance
3. Schedule criticality
4. Cost objectives and priority of NASA
5. NASA Procurement goals/policy
6. Legal constraints
7. Number of capable contractors
8. Availability of funding
9. Number of units required and timing
of requirements
10. Systems/Subsystems/Modules/Iterns/Services
Involved.
Objectives
1. Sell program to Congress ..: .
and OMB
~. • <
2. Meet schedule needs
3. Maximize competition
4. Provided/equitable price for contractor
risk/responsibility
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Cognizant NASA Management
1. Project Manager and Staff
2. Managing center functional offices
3. Program office
4. Procurement (Hq/Center)
5. Hq-Legal
6. Hq-Comptroller
7. Hq-Top Management
Major Activities and Decisions
1. Use of sole source vs competition
2. On contracts for multiple buys:
-separate R§D from production
-firm orders vs options
-plans for recompetition
-separate R§D competition
.(phased project planning)
-separate R§D performance fron prototype testing
3. Acquisition of subsystems/modules:
-NASA directed subs vs contractor
furnished equipment vs GFE
-In-house systems integration vs
contracted systems integration
-changes from unit-to-unit
4. Contract Price types:
-FP:
-where target cost accuracy high
-where efficiency options lacking
-where no changes expected
-base for escalation precisely defined
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-FPI:
-where target cost estimate- fairly accurate
i
-where negotiation and price administration
experience good
-where ability to specify efficiency
options is good and NASA objectives clear
-CPIF: _.-.,„-:.,
-target cost estimate^isT'-mo.derately -accurate
-contractor has ability to control incentive areas
-willingness to invoke limit of funds clause
-control of direction of contractor action in
multiple incentives can be! maintained
-CPAF:
-performance criteria difficult to quanity
in advance
-scope of work difficult to determine in
advance
i
-multiple performance criteria required
5. Develop cost estimate, Worlc breakdown Structure
-historical costs
-cost as f; (related costs)
-cost as f- (performance specs)
-item analogy
-expert opinion
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6. Develop funding schedule
7. Open vs Qualified Bidder advertising
8. Select control System
9. Final project/budget approval
10. Draft RFP
B) Contractor • - . _ * •',% ~:-y • •
Enviranmental Analysis
1. NASA expectations and priorities regarding
contractor proposals
2. Contractor capacity available
3. Availability of engineering talent
4. Availability of management talent
5. Contractor level of technology development
6. Potential sales volume (including follow-ups)
7. NASA managers! responses to marketing activities
on technical, -suggestions .
8. Level of understanding of NASA requirements
9. Analyze cost of proposal development
Objectives
1. Influence technical specifications to fit capability
2. Influence perception of appropriateness of contractor
as sole source
3. Influence funding level
4. Influence NASA choice of pricing strategy to maximize
sales, minimize risk
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Strategies
1. Market technical approaches
2. Market contractor technical and management
capability
3. "Threaten" to non-compete under certain conditions
(e.g., Fixed Price)
4. Avoid committing funding for proposal if competitors
..are .-more rcapable" c••'
5. Support funding if contract perceived as good
opportunity
6. Determine whether to commit proposal development
resources to project:
-as prime contractor
-as subsystem contractor
-as prime and subsystem contractor
Stage 5 Source -Evaluation and Award
A) NASA
Influences
1. Project objectives and priorities
2. Funding limitations
3. Contractor responsiveness/proposals,
4. Contractor past performance
5. Perceptions of contractor capability
6. Prime/Subcontractor relationship
7. Degree of project definition
8. Scope and type of expected changes
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9. SEE membership
10. Legal requirements
Objectives
1. Select contractor most capable of meeting
project objectives
2. Avoid "buy-ins"
Cognizant NASA Management
1. Center top management
2. Source Evaluation Board (SEE)
3. Legal
4. NASA Administrator
5. Procurement Office
6. Program Office
Major Activities/Decisions
1. Selection of SEE members
2. Develop SEE criteria/priorities
-technical criteria
-business criteria
3. Release RFP<^__
4. Evaluation of proposals
' -business'- analysis
-price:' analysis
-technical analysis
5. Select major contenders
6. Conduct oral questioning
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7. SEE recommendation
8. Center/Program Office Reactions
9. Source selection
10. Debriefing of losers
B) Contractors -_.
Environmental Analysis
1. Competitive Analysis
-competitive bid histories
-competitors' capacity
-competitors' technical positioning
for project
-expected NASA evaluation of competitors'
prior performance
2. Customer Analysis
-expected decision criteria priorities based
on RFP, marketing, and informal interactions
-degree of project definition
-perceived effectiveness of contractor
marketing efforts in influencing evaluation
-analysis of SEE members' skills and priorities
3. Financial Analysis .:~
-direct cost requirements
-indirect cost requirements
-opportunity costs of foregoing alternative
contracts (if at full capacity)
-inflation estimates
-cash flow requirements
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- investment requirements
-anticipated G§A and profit from subcontracting
-anticipated cost/profit gain from change order
-potential discounted value of follow-on orders
if contract is received
-overhead allocation
-current financial leverage
4. Risk Analysis'
-technical uncertainty and performance risk
-schedule risk and penalties
-uncertainty of cost estimates for fixed
price contracts
-ability to control subcontractor cost,
schedule, .technical performance
-probability estimate of obtaining award at
various competitive bid prices
5. Organizational Factors
-corporate profit center structure
-internal basis for divisional, project, or
profit center evaluation
-dollar net profit
-net. prof it as, :a percent of sales
-profit return as a percent ;ef-incremental
investment
^profit return on;allocated burden
-total dollar contribution to,overhead
and profit
-65-
6. Analysis of long-term technical gains
-ability to obtain related NASA/DOD business
-commercial applications
-development of engineering staff skills
Objectives
1. Sales volume (for stability of employment, facility
utilization)
2. Overhead contribution
3. Develop technical base
4. Position for future sales
5. Return on investment
6. Avoid loss
7. Attain satisfactory after-tax profit goals
8. Minimize cash flow requirements
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Strategies
1. Cost based pricing strategies
-accept overly-sophisticated or poorly defined
specifications
-incorporate costly testing requirements
-recommend "gold-plated" specifications
-buy-ins which cover marginal cost plus
some overhead
-pessimistic escalator clause indices
-cost modeling with heavy allocation to
direct costs on which escalators will apply
2. Revenue-based pricing strategies
-orient bid toward funding limit
-propose incentives as alternatives to
mandatory performance requirements
-buy--in on R§D segment based on expected contri-
bution from production segment of contract
3. Proposal selling strategies
-orient proposal toward RFP/SEB criteria
-sell company capability based on past performance
-emphasize quality staffing
-sell contractor's willingness to assume high
cost risk by emphasizing high fixed costs
-show special achievements required and con-
tractor's capability to attain them
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4. Supplemental financial strategies " - . _
-reduce investment by use of Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) and Progress Payments
-buy-in with expectation of change orders
-expand use of subcontractors to earn subcon-
tracting G§A and profit
-make allowance to permit reduced subcontracting
if excess capacity is large
-request options for later takeover of CFE from
GFE on block buys with sequential production,
either to get G§A from subs or to expand amount
of contractor work volume
Stage 4 Negotiation
A-NASA
Influences
1. Degree of project definition
2. Type of contract
3. Confidence in NASA cost model
4. Project priorities
5. Responsiveness of original proposal
6. Funding limitations
7. Bargaining position
8. Variety of items to be negotiated
9. Type of control system
10. Contractor finances
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Objectives
1. Maximize visibility and control of costs and
performance to meet project objectives within
funding limits
Cognizant Management
1. Contracting Officer
2. Project Manager
3. Center Functional Offices
4. Procurement Office
Major Activities and Decisions
1. Pre-negotiation plan
-price target
-desired control system/reports
-testing requirements
2. Agreement on
-progress payment plan
-change procedures
-award fee milestones
-indirect and overhead cost rates
-auditing procedure
-subcontractor management
-overhead allocation to R§D vs Production
-incentive plan
-target cost
-ceiling price
-share ratios
-incentive range
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-award fee criteria and payment plan
-government investment
B) Contractor
Environmental Analysis
1. Cost target analysis -
-tightness of estimates
-existence of overrun bias
-existence of underrun bias
2. Range of contract items to be negotiated
-cost and type of reporting system
-performance standard
-R§QA standards
-progress payment schedules
-contract change prodedure
-cost allowances/audits
-basis for overhead charges
-procedure for award fees
3. Analysis of incentive contracts (where applicable)
-measureability of performance targets "
-definition of upper technical limits
-cost incentive range
-trade-off opportunities on multidimensional
incentives
-contractor ability to control performance
outcomes
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4. Decision-making patterns in NASA
-project office priorities
-user/program office priorities
-contracting officer priorities
-avoid large underruns
-maximize contractor risk
-avoid cost padding and obtain
low indirect, overhead costs
-degree of consensus among NASA negotiating
team members
5. NASA bargaining position . . • .'-
-availability of other contractors
-profitability of contract
-top management support of negotiator
-potential threat of reopening competition
-long lead time available
6. Con/tractor bargaining position
. . . • < - - • • » * - . .
-availability of other business
-knowledge of NASA funding limits
-knowledge of own technical superiority over
competitors
-lack of project definition
-program urgency
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-relative experience and status of negotiators
-knowledge of opposing negotiator priorities
-unified position of negotiation team members
Objectives "^ -j__" _ ~ "__ •
1. Maintain project control
-control systems with low visibility
-open change procedures
-control on technical and manpower specifications
-avoid NASA direction of subcontractors
2. Clarify responsibility
-technical performance standards
-statement of GFE responsibility
3. Maintain relationship with contracting
officer/customers
4. Recoup buy-in losses
5. Minimize contractor investment
6. Maximize cash flow
I
7. Position for follow-ons
8. Minimize risk of loss
Strategies - -.. •'.„ I-.,.,_.,_ ~ :- - •--' :-"_'
1. Structure cost allocation to show low indirect
cost rates that appeal to contracting officer
2. Obtain incentives permitting flexibility in
performance standards
3. Attempt to tie funding to level of effort
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4. Obtain simplified control systems by lowering
price of compliance
5. Obtain disclaimers of responsibility for
follow-on work
6. Avoid cost saving investments,
7. Argue that due to high fixed costs, small
percentage of cost is controllable
8. Obtain language of "goals" rather than
"requirements"
9. Point out risks involved in accepting mandatory
/*
requirements where contract .is CPIF
10. Build in contingencies can b;e^ "sacrif iee'd'.. --"<-•
11. Identify with project manager
12. Gamesmanships approaches
13. On incentive contracts:
-if cost target has overrun bias, bargain for
low share ratios, high ceilings
-if cost target has underrun bias, bargain for
high share ratios, accept lower ceilings
-if cost targets are tight, bargain for loose
change provisions
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Stage 5 Contract Management
A) NASA
Influences
1. Project objectives/requirements and
change in them
2. Contractor progress/performance/responsiveness
3. Control systems/reports and visibility
4. Contractor initiated changes
5. Technical problems
6. Funding limit and schedule
7. Cost growth
8. User/scientific investigator needs
Objectives
1. Meet performance requirements
2. Meet schedule requirements
3. Obtain necessary funding
4. Meet target cost
NASA Decision-Makers/Management
1. Project Manager § Staff
2. Center functional offices
3. Program Office
4. Contract Administrator
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Major Activities/Decisions
1. Revise work schedules to meet requirements
and constraints
2. Negotiate changes
3. Make progress payments
4. Make awards
5. Negotiate overhead costs
6. Generate additional funding for overruns
7. Invoke limitation of funds clause
8. Negotiate revised target costs and/or
share ratios
9. Complete documentation
B) Contractor
Environmental Analysis
1. NASA project manager priorities
2. Change orders from NASA
3. Contractor change opportunities
4. Cash flow
5. Technical problems
6. Inflation
7. Budgetary constraints
8. Personnel changes in NASA management
9. Change in capacity due to completion or
receipt of other contracts
10. Type of contract in related contracts and in
main contract
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11. Type of reporting system
12. Fee structure
13. Change order procedure
14. Program office authority within-NASA
15. Effectiveness of DCAA audits
16. Probability of contract termination due
to cost overrun
17. Schedule slippages initiated by NASA
18. Profit opportunities anticipated
from awards fees
19. Loss of excess fees by Renegotiation
Board action
Obj ectives
1. Maintain project control
2. Maximize work effort
3. Minimize layoffs
4. Facilitate technical advancement and high
reliability goals of technical staff
5. Maintain customer relations by avoiding large
profit percentage, large underruns, large over-
runs (where loss can be avoided) and by quality
technical performance
6. Meet minimum profit and contribution goals
acceptable to contractor top management
Strategies
1. Where minimum organizational profits are assured:
-consider trade-off of after-tax value of cost
incentive profits vs fixed overhead contri-
bution lost per dollar of cost reduction
-trade cost incentives for manpower utilization
where excess capacity exists
-trade cost incentives for increased assurance
of reliability to meet quality goals of techni-
cal personnel • --r.li,---c:r , rc:.^  .
2. Where related contracts are in progress, shift
the allocation of fixed costs :-
-from FP to FPI, CPI contracts
-from CPI to CPAF contracts
-from high share ratio to low share ratio
incentive contracts
3. Add costs to avoid- - ;
-excess profits
-annual budget underruns
-large cost underruns
4. Begin work on changes before negotiation to
obtain "allowable" rather than "reasonable"
cost -. .
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5. Delay documentation requirements used for
competition on follow-on work
6. Reduce- subcontracting if'.total s-ales drop
7. Load manpower early to speed progress payments
8. Load manpower rather than equipment for tasks
if overhead rate tied to direct labor hours
9. Schedule work to meet funding a-yailaMlity
rather than costs
10. Negotiate cost targets upward through changes
11. On multiple incentive contracts, structure
performance/cost/schedule tradeoffs in work
scheduling to maximize incentives - restructure
over time toward attainable incentives . ;
